b01lers

Purdue University

Jacob White
Jack Roscoe
Gabriel Samide
Jihun Hwang (Jimmy)
Kevin Yu
Phillip Frey
b01lers… Assemble!

Nick Andry, Philip Frey, Jorge Hernandez, Neil Van Eikema Hommes, Jihun Hwang, Siddharth Muralee, Jaxson Pahukula, Mihir Patil, Adrian Persaud, Jack Roscoe, Gabriel Samide, Lucas Tan, Vinh Pham Ngoc Thanh, Vivan Tiwari, Jacob White, Susan Wu, Kevin Yu

Advised By: Professors Christina Garman, Kazem Taram, Santiago Torres-Arias
Design Phase
Design Goals & Overview

Host Computer

Host Computer

Component 1

Component 2

Application Processor

I2C

I2C

I2C

Medical Device

UART
Attest Protocol

- Hash & Check PIN ($0x000000$–$0xFFFFFFFF$) like a password.
- Component challenges the AP to respond with expected ID.
- Component encrypts attest data for valid AP to decrypt.
Replace Protocol

- Hash & Check **Replacement Token (16 B!)** like a password...

1. Token, CID → CID'
2. $H(\text{Token}) \neq h_{C_1}$
Boot Protocol

- Components and AP challenge each other to check who they say they are.
- AP and Components wait to verify each other and respond before booting.

1. Send $\text{chal} \& \text{Verify AuthEnc(Sign(\ldots))}$
2. Send $\text{chal} \& \text{Verify AuthEnc(Sign(\ldots))}$
3. Send boot resp cmd.
Messaging Protocol

- Generates random challenge to include with signed message.
- Signatures verify the specific identity of Component or AP’s messages.
  - Actuator shouldn’t pretend to be an insulin pump.
  - Components shouldn’t pretend to be AP.

1. Send $\text{chal}$
2. $\sigma = \text{Sign}(\text{CID} \ || \ \text{chal} \ || \ \text{msg})$
3. Verify $\sigma$
Security Features

Passwords (PINs)

- Salted and hashed with a “slow” hash function (bcrypt).
- Defends against both offline and online dictionary attacks.
Security Features (Cont.)

Hardware Abstraction Layer (HAL)

- Re-wrote firmware in Rust.
- Memory safe by default!
Security Features (Cont.)

Build-time Encrypted Data

- Attestation Key is only stored on the AP, not on Components.
- Attestation Data is not directly stored anywhere inside.
Security Features (Cont.)

Compile-time address randomization (ASLR)

- Randomized memory section offsets.
- Frustrates buffer overflow or similar attacks.
Security Features (Cont.)

Random Delays and Repeated Checks

- Protection against fault injection, timing and glitching attacks, etc.
Design Summary
Potential Improvements

- Require secret sharing from all components & AP to boot.
- Two way C-R and sequence numbers for post-boot.
- Activate the board’s Memory Protection Unit (MPU).
- Use stronger memory-hard hashes (e.g. Argon2id) [1] for Attest PIN.

Attack Phase
I2C Interrupt Handler Buffer Overflow

The interrupt handler did not properly handle repeated restart.

- Only checks if the stop flag is set for executing end of transaction code.
  - … which is only set when I2C stop code transmitted!
- A repeated restart message can start a transaction without sending an I2C stop code.

```c
// Transaction over interrupt
if (Flags & MXC_F_I2C_INTFL0_STOP) {
```
I2C Exploit (Cont.) Transaction Threshold

1. Transaction start sets WRITE_START register to be TRUE.

2. Active register is set when WRITE_START is TRUE. This allows active register to be switched mid transaction.

3. If WRITE_INDEX > active register size, large buffer overflow is possible.
I2C Exploit Details

Buffer overflow -> Memory Corruption

- Write bytes, switch from a large register to a small register with repeated restart.
- WRITE_INDEX will be out of bounds!
- A large buffer overflow occurs, and bytes can be written in from I2C in many repeated restarts
  - Pointer in interrupt vector table overwritten to jump to shellcode
How We Used I2C Exploit

- **Attacks with Physical Access**
  - Python scripts communicate with malicious AP and shellcode on component to retrieve flash dump
  - Flags and keys can be retrieved from flash dump

- **Supply Chain Flags**
  - Shellcode running on the component will dump its flash over i2c
  - Malicious AP will receive this dump and print it out base64 encoded

**Diagram Description**

- Buffer Overflow
- Receive Done Register
- Nop Sled ➤ ➤ ➤ ➤ ➤
- Shellcode
- Shellcode Address
- Interrupt Vector Table
- Code Execution Redirected
Potential Improvements to I2C Exploit

- Other teams were aware of the exploit, so it was a race to get first bloods
  - We could manually do the easier 4 in physical access flags in about 3-4 minutes, but other teams automated systems could do it in about one minute

- Improvements
  - Don’t require receive done address, use a nop sled instead
  - Fully automate I2C exploit

![Diagram of I2C exploit]

- Buffer Overflow
- Nop Sled ➔ Shellcode ➔ Shellcode Address
- Interrupt Vector Table
- Print Sled (Receive Done Register) ➔ Shellcode Address ➔ Shellcode ➔ Code Execution Redirected
Attack Impacts and Countermeasures

● Potential Impact
  ○ Arbitrary code execution resulting in numerous potential attacks
    ■ Exfiltrating attestation data, boot messages, and secret keys stored in the flash, modifying vital hardware registers, and manipulating intended functionality

● Suggested Countermeasures
  ○ Reset the read and write indexes are reset even after a repeated restart
  ○ Ensure out of bounds writes are not possible
  ○ Redesign the interrupt handler
Exploiting Protocol Flaws

- Static token to authenticate AP and components
  - Some teams had a secret token used to authenticate the AP sent in plaintext
  - The token could be received by a malicious component, then replayed by a malicious AP

- Boot authentication does not include component ID
  - e.g. in challenge response authentication for boot

![Diagram showing component interactions and relay message forwarding.](image-url)
Protocol Flaws Countermeasures

- **Potential Impacts**
  - Attacker can maliciously impersonate devices and perform operations only authorized devices should be able to perform
  - Includes operations such as booting MISC system and querying attestation data without the need for authentication

- **Countermeasures**
  - Utilize challenge response instead of just a fixed token
  - Challenge response should include the component ids in some form
Other Attacks

- We investigated possibility of dropping packets in operational pump swap
  - Drop the low insulin reading packets, and only forward the high packets
    - Several teams (us included) did not fully ensure post boot packets arrived in order
  - This ended up not working due to the way post boot messaging was implemented
What We Learned

- Focus on getting infra set up
  - Having to pass around boards manually, and not having a way for everyone to work on development / exploits at the same time hindered us a lot

- Read rules more carefully
  - We had to redesign our replace / boot protocol near the end of design phase because we didn’t realise that AP cannot talk to component during replace
  - We didn’t realise until the very end that all flags were stored in attest data and boot message, so we can do extra things like encrypting all of them at build time and use some sort of secret sharing scheme to recover decryption keys
Final Comments

- With more time and resources, what other things would you have done?
  - Design Phase: **Prevent fault injection attacks**, digitally sign features, randomize binary layout, compile with Checked/C thoroughly audit crypto libraries + code
  - Attack Phase: Side-channel attacks, automate common attacks

- What was the most valuable thing you learned during the competition?
  - Read the rules properly (Strategy is very important)
  - Prep infra/tools for attack phase earlier

Source: Purdue eCTF 2023 slides
Final Comments

- Improvements to be made:
  - Quickly establish threat model and outline of protocol implementation
  - Spin up (fully...) functioning development and attack infra
  - Immediately start Rusty development - What even is an MSDK?

We immensely enjoyed the competition; thank you to the MITRE organizers and eCTF sponsors for your hard work in making this event possible.

See You Next Year!
Backup Slides